No special DMM lane
The official market-making page states that there is no DMM program, special fee arrangement or latency advantage. Anyone can market-make through the public exchange interfaces and APIs.
That equal access does not make outcomes equal. Infrastructure location, state handling, risk limits, quoting logic and capital still determine whether a strategy survives.
Post-only intent and queue risk
ALO orders protect maker intent by preventing immediate taker execution. They do not guarantee a fill, favorable queue position or profitable spread. A Chase order reprices in the browser and is not a substitute for a server-side quoting engine.
A maker must handle partial fills, self-trade prevention, tick and lot constraints, stale quotes and cancel acknowledgements. Never assume a local order state is final until reconciled with exchange state.
Spread and rebates must exceed real losses
Gross spread and maker rebates are only the visible revenue. Adverse selection, inventory drift, funding, hedging, failed cancels, slippage and liquidation can dominate them.
Hyperliquid’s maker-rebate tiers depend on the user’s share of rolling weighted maker volume. A zero maker-fee tier and a negative maker rebate are separate conditions; model the actual account response.
Operational controls before scale
Start with a testnet integration, then minimal mainnet size. Market making is an execution business, not passive yield, and a stable backtest does not reproduce queue position or live adverse selection.
- Use idempotent client order IDs and deterministic reconciliation.
- Set inventory, notional, loss and open-order limits.
- Cancel on stale data and degraded connectivity.
- Respect IP, address and congestion rate limits.
- Test kill switches and withdrawal access independently.