Separate the risk layers

Hyperliquid uses its own L1, validator-published oracle prices and bridge routes. The official audit page covers reviewed bridge code. Treat each audit as evidence about the listed code and review date, then assess L1, validator, oracle, liquidity and execution risk separately.

Add user-controlled risks: compromised signing devices, wrong-chain deposits, malicious front ends, oversized leverage, crowded funding and stop slippage. Each layer needs a different control.

LayerExamplePractical control
KeySeed or signer compromiseDedicated wallet; hardware signing
BridgeContract or transfer failureTest transfer; limit parked capital
ChainValidator or liveness eventSize exposure; monitor status
MarketThin depth or oracle stressLimit size; stress slippage
PositionLeverage and liquidationPredefined loss; margin buffer

Self-custody is a responsibility transfer

You control signing, but funds deposited into the trading system still depend on protocol infrastructure. A hardware wallet protects a key from some attacks; it does not validate an economic decision or guarantee the front end is genuine.

Use bookmarks, verify domains, read transaction intent and separate trading capital. No legitimate support agent needs a seed phrase.

A conservative operating policy

Use the risk table and operating policy to identify the failure modes you can tolerate. Then decide how much capital to assign to each risk layer.

  • Deposit only capital assigned to active trading.
  • Test deposits and withdrawals.
  • Use a separate wallet and revoke unrelated approvals.
  • Keep leverage below the point where normal volatility threatens liquidation.
  • Treat displayed APRs, funding and past vault returns as variable.
  • Have an exit path that does not depend on one interface.